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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This JL unc District Court of 
the Second Judicial District granting ?:he motion loi 'uMiiiWj \ 
judgment of the defendant Department of Human Services (hereinafter 
"DHS" d deny my hereinafter 
"Nelson J motion for summary judgment Appeal was taken In MM 
Utah Supreme Court whic jurisdiction .^ aei section 7 8-2-
2(3)(j) subsequently 
transferred the case -, tne tUi.rt of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Whether the iowej Nelson 
was excluded from the Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) 1 household pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §602(a)(24). 
STANDARD ^EVIEW 
In reviewing an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the 
appelj -i he facts j n * "* - favorable to the 
losing party below. determining wheti 
aatter it r > f judgment for e prevailing party 
.. .
 Lves n o deference to the trial court " s 
conclusions • . ,. are reviewed tor cot reuLneb,1, Blue Ciuhb 
& Blue Shield v. State, r.2d 634 (Utah 1989). The issue was 
pi uhuj "i 'en I in ijpppi itiiii - motion for summary judgment. R-24. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL pRQVISli 'ATtHES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
42 U.S.C. §602(a) '^ & tot\ 
45 C.F.R. §233.20(a)(ii) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case 
This case arose in October 1992, when a processing delay by 
the Social Security Administration (SSA) caused Nelson's son to be 
declared ineligible for AFDC and Medicaid benefits for one year. 
In that month, Nelson was found eligible for both Social Security 
Disability Insurance Benefits (SSDI) and Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI). However, the SSA processing delay resulted in a 
retroactive SSDI check arriving before a retroactive SSI check. 
Nelson had no control over which check SSA processed and issued 
first. Whether SSA issues the SSDI or SSI check first is 
completely arbitrary. Had the SSI check arrived first, Nelson 
would have been excluded from the AFDC household, her SSDI would 
not have been considered and this case would not have arisen. DHS, 
however, interpreted an AFDC statute—42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(24)—as 
meaning that the delay in receiving the SSI check precluded Nelson 
from being an SSI recipient. Applying AFDC lump sum rules that 
apply to SSDI—but not SSI—DHS declared Nelson's son ineligible. 
Nelson did everything required of her under the law: she 
reported her disability determination, and her SSI retroactive 
award was offset by the AFDC benefits she received during the time 
her disability application was pending. She received nothing to 
which she was not entitled by law. But for the SSA processing 
delay, the lump sum rule would not have been applied and Nelson's 
son, like many other children of disabled mothers, would have 
continued to receive benefits. 
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B. Course Of The Proceedings 
Nelson requested a hearing to contest the denial of benefits 
to her son. After receiving no relief through the administrative 
system, Nelson filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. Both 
parties filed motions for summary judgment and the issues were 
fully briefed. The lower court found as a matter of law that 
deference was owed to a federal policy offered by DHS in support of 
its action and granted summary judgment to defendant. This appeal 
followed. 
C. Disposition At Trial Court Or Agency 
The motion for summary judgment filed by DHS was granted. 
Nelson's motion for summary judgment was denied. 
D. Relevant Facts With Citations To The Record 
Nelson and her son were receiving AFDC and Medicaid in July 
1992. Record (hereinafter "R"), at 46. On July 28, 1992, Nelson 
applied for disability under two related federal programs: SSDI and 
SSI. R-42, 66. On October 17, 1992, Nelson received notice from 
SSA that she had been found disabled and was eligible for SSDI 
benefits starting in August 1991. R-8. On October 22, 1992, 
Nelson received further notice from SSA that she would soon be 
receiving a check in the amount of $4918.00, representing 
retroactive SSDI benefits accrued during the time period from 
August 1991 through September 1992; she was further advised that 
her monthly SSDI check would be $335.00. R-ll. On October 27, 
1992, Nelson delivered copies of the notices to her caseworker in 
the Ogden office. R-67. 
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On October 28, 1992, Nelson was notified by her caseworker 
that her case would be closed and, as a result, her son would be 
ineligible for AFDC and Medicaid benefits from November 1992 
through October 1993. R-43. The disqualification resulted from 
AFDC policy which disqualified for a period of time those 
households which received lump sums. R-46. 
On November 5, 1992, Nelson delivered to her caseworker a 
computer printout from SSA showing that she had also been found 
eligible for SSI benefits from the date of her application in July 
1992, with development pending. R-42, 67. SSA did not process 
Nelson's SSI benefits until December 1992, when a retroactive SSI 
check was sent to Nelson. R-54, Her retroactive SSDI check was 
received in October 1992; DHS treated $4,487.00 of that check as 
a lump sum. R-43. 
Nelson delivered to her caseworker an updated computer 
printout from SSA, dated December 10, 1992, confirming that she had 
been eligible for SSI since July 1992, and that she would receive 
a retroactive SSI benefit check, together with recurring monthly 
benefits. R-44. Nelson asked that the decision denying her son 
AFDC and Medicaid be reversed, since she had been an SSI recipient 
at the time her son's eligibility was reviewed. R-68. 
Nelson requested and appeared at a hearing where she argued 
that under federal law, the SSDI she received should have been 
excluded from household income when her son's eligibility was 
determined, because she had been an SSI recipient. At the hearing, 
additional facts were developed, including: (1) if the SSI payment 
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had been received prior to the SSDI payment, the lump sum rule 
would not have been applied (R-50); (2) the delay in processing 
Nelson's SSI claim from application to recipient status was the 
fault of the Social Security Administration (R-51); and (3) it was 
the delay in processing by SSA that caused Nelson to be included in 
the household and her son declared ineligible for one year's 
benefits (R-51). The hearing officer rejected Nelson's arguments, 
however, and refused to reinstate her son for benefits. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Under the plain language of section 602(a)(24), Nelson should 
have been treated as an SSI recipient at the time her SSDI check 
arrived. At least one other case that reviewed similar facts 
supports this argument. In the alternative, the court should find 
that the federal policy offered by DHS does not apply to the facts 
of this case and is not controlling. Nelson urges the court to 
adopt a more reasonable interpretation of the statute, thereby 
avoiding an unreasonable result which would deny a dependent, needy 
child AFDC and Medicaid benefits, because of a delay in processing 
over which he and his mother had no control. 
ARGUMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nelson asks this court to reverse a lower court decision which 
approved her son's loss of a year's financial assistance and 
Medicaid, simply because of a processing delay by the Social 
Security Administration. Before considering the arguments for 
granting Nelson the relief she seeks, it is important to understand 
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what caused this unfair result. 
A. The Interrelationship of SSDI and SSI 
Typically, a person claiming disability applies for federal 
benefits under both the SSDI and SSI programs, which are fully 
funded and administered by the federal government. The two 
programs share a common definition of disability and the same 
sequential evaluation process is followed in making the 
determination. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505, .1520; 416.905, .920. The 
main difference between the two is the source of funding: SSDI is 
an insurance program funded by joint worker/employee contributions 
while the worker is employed. To qualify for SSDI, the applicant 
must have the requisite quarters of coverage and be insured at the 
time disability began. SSI is an income maintenance program and is 
available to any blind, disabled or elderly person, regardless of 
work history. 
The monthly benefit amount for SSDI purposes varies, depending 
upon the amount paid into the Social Security system while the 
person was working. The amount of SSI to which a person may be 
eligible is reduced by earned and unearned income, including SSDI 
benefits. Currently, a single SSI recipient with no other income 
is entitled to a maximum benefit of $470.00 per month. 
The process for determining eligibility under either program 
begins with the filing of a joint application at the Social 
Security district office. The disability decision is made by the 
Disability Determination Service in Salt Lake City which contracts 
with Social Security to perform this function. Once determined 
6 
disabled for SSDI purposes, an applicant may be paid retroactive 
benefits up to twelve months before the date of application. In 
contrast, SSI benefits for a successful applicant start with the 
date of application. Since a disability determination can often 
take months, the successful disability applicant is usually 
entitled to a retroactive payment of benefits covering the months 
the claim was pending. 
The actual processing of SSDI and SSI benefits takes place 
outside of Utah, usually in Baltimore, Maryland. Whether SSA 
processes the SSDI application first or the SSI application is 
completely arbitrary. Usually, the SSI award is paid first and the 
calculation of SSDI occurs subsequently. However, in some cases, 
and for unexplained reasons, the SSDI award is calculated and paid 
first. While in most cases this arbitrary event makes no 
difference to the SSDI/SSI recipient, in Nelson's case it had 
serious consequences, because she and her son were AFDC recipients 
at the time her SSDI retroactive benefits were paid. 
B. The AFDC Program1 
The AFDC program was based on a scheme of cooperative 
federalism designed to provide financial assistance to needy, 
dependent children and the parents or relatives who lived with and 
cared for them. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316, 20 L.Ed..2d 1118 
*On August 22, 1996, the President signed into law the Welfare 
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996), effectively 
abolishing the AFDC program and replacing it with the Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families program. The discussion of the AFDC 
program herein is based upon the law as it existed at the time 
these issues arose. 
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(1968). A state participating in the program was reimbursed by the 
federal government for a portion of the funds it spent on benefits. 
42 U.S.C. §603 (1991). In return for receiving federal financial 
participation, the state was required to administer its AFDC 
program pursuant to a state plan conforming to applicable federal 
statutes and regulations. 42 U.S.C. §602 (1991). Children found 
eligible for AFDC were automatically eligible for health benefits 
under Medicaid. 42 U.S.C. §1396(a)(10)(A)(1991). States were 
required to consider a family's income and resources when 
determining eligibility; benefits were not allowed once income 
exceeded a prescribed amount. 42 U.S.C. §602(a)(7)(A)(1991). 
In 1981, legislation was adopted which added the "lump sum 
rule" to the AFDC system. 42 U.S.C. §602(a) (17) (1991) . Under this 
provision, a family that received in a month a lump sum of 
nonrecurring income which, when added to the family's other income, 
exceeded the standard of need for that household would be 
ineligible for a certain number of months from receiving AFDC. 
This rule applied to the lump sum of SSDI benefits which Nelson 
received in November 1992. When the amount of the lump sum was 
divided by her household's standard of need, it resulted in twelve 
months of ineligibility. 
There is a second AFDC rule which is at the heart of this 
appeal. The statute excludes from the AFDC eligibility calculation 
any recipient of SSI benefits. Because of its centrality to 
Nelson's argument, the relevant section is quoted in its entirety: 
A State plan for aid and services to needy 
families with children must— 
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(24) provide that if an individual is 
receiving benefits under subchapter XVI2 of 
this chapter ... thenf for the period for 
which such benefits are received . . . such 
individual shall not be regarded as a member 
of a family for purposes of determining the 
amount of the benefits of the family under 
this subchapter and his income and resources 
shall not be counted as income and resources 
of a family under this subchapter; 
42 U.S.C. §602(a)(24) (emphasis added). 
II. UNDER THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE STATUTE, NELSON'S SSDI 
BENEFITS SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED FROM CONSIDERATION 
Nelson has argued since the inception of her case that under 
the AFDC statute and regulations she should have been excluded from 
the AFDC household because she was an SSI recipient, which would 
have left her son eligible for benefits. The federal regulation 
which implements the statute provides that a state AFDC plan musts 
(ii) Provide that the needs, income
 # and 
resources of individuals receiving SSI 
benefits under Title XVI ... for the period 
for which such benefits are received, shall 
not be included in determining the need and 
the amount of the assistance payment of an 
AFDC assistance unit. 
45 C.F.R. §233.20(a) (ii) . See Addendum. The Utah Office of Family 
Support (OFS), the DHS branch administering AFDC, recognized that 
SSI recipients were excluded, for its policy at the time provided, 
in relevant part: 
SSI recipients in an AFDC household must be 
excluded from the household grant. Do not use 
Subchapter XVI is that portion of the Social Security Act 
containing the eligibility requirements for SSI. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 
et. sea. 
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the income and assets of SSI recipients to 
determine eligibility or to calculate the 
grant for the household. 
UTAH-DHS-OFS Vol. II §212-1. See Addendum. 
Nelson's argument made at her initial administrative hearing 
remains valid: the statute and regulations can be read to exclude 
her as an SSI recipient from the AFDC household and it is 
fundamentally unfair to base her son's eligibility on an arbitrary 
event over which he had no control. At least one state court in 
reviewing identical facts agreed with this argument. In Gleim v. 
Com. Dept. of Public Welfare, 409 A.2d 951 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980), 
Eldora Gleim had applied for AFDC on May 8, 1978. Her husband, 
James E. Gleim, had applied for SSI benefits one month earlier on 
April 8f 1978. Owing to SSA's delay in processing the SSI claim, 
James Gleim did not receive a retroactive SSI payment until August 
9, 1978. The Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare (DPW) 
included James in Eldora Gleim's AFDC household, maintaining that 
he was not an SSI recipient until he actually received his benefit 
check, even though he had been accruing benefits from the date of 
his application. The Pennsylvania court found that the plain 
meaning of 602(a)(24) required a finding that James was an SSI 
recipient. It concluded: 
Gleim received SSI benefits for the entire 
period between April 8, 1978, and August 9, 
1978, although official notice was not 
received and payments were not paid until 
August 9, 1978. Therefore, under the plain 
language of the statute, Gleim became a 
recipient at that date which SSA found him to 
be eligible, April 8, 1978, and his inclusion 
within the family unit for AFDC grant purposes 
beyond that date was improper. 
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Id., at 952. The Gleim court observed that DPW's reading of the 
statute led to illogical and inconsistent results, since two 
individuals declared eligible for SSI on April 8, 1978, might 
become "recipients" on widely varying dates, solely because of 
processing delays at the SSA level. 
This court has the authority to determine whether the plain 
language of 602(a)(24) is clear and unambiguous. The plain 
language itself is ordinarily regarded as conclusive, absent some 
expression of legislative intent to the contrary. North Dakota v. 
United States, 460 U.S. 300, 312, 75 L.Ed.2d 77, 103 S.Ct. 1095 
(1983). The court should follow the example of the Gleim court and 
find that the plain language of the statute excluded Nelson from 
the AFDC household. Nelson began receiving SSI benefits from her 
first day of eligibility, even though a check for those accrued 
benefits was not sent to her by SSA until several months later. 
The statute does not require that a disabled person eligible for 
SSI benefits actually have the benefits in hand in order to be 
excluded from AFDC consideration. It excludes the SSI recipient 
from the AFDC household "for the period for which such benefits are 
received..." The period for which Nelson received SSI benefits 
dated from July 1992, when she applied for SSI. Therefore, Nelson 
should have been excluded from the AFDC household and her son 
allowed to continue receiving financial and medical benefits. 
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING DEFERENCE TO A FEDERAL 
POLICY THAT DID NOT APPLY TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
When the case was argued on summary judgment at the lower 
court, DHS produced and entered in the record Action Transmittal 
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No. ACF-AT-93-20 prepared by Diann Dawson, Acting Director of the 
Office of Family Assistance at the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services. R-124. See Addendum. This document purports to 
set forth federal policy addressing the issue raised in this 
appeal. The lower court accepted the document as federal policy, 
to which deference must be given, and it held: 
The Court rules that the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 
§602(a)(24) is susceptible to two reasonable 
interpretations. However, the Court agrees 
with defendant and accords substantial 
deference to the interpretation espoused by 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services who 
is charged by Congress with implementing and 
enforcing this statute. The Secretary 
reconciles the overlap between the AFDC and 
SSI benefit programs by a policy that funds 
are not received until the recipient actually 
receives them. This policy is congruent with 
the operative language of the statute. 
R-131-32. A careful review of the alleged policy shows that it was 
not addressed to the specific facts of this case and, even if it 
could be so construed, is not a permissible policy interpretation 
to which deference is owed. 
A. The Policy Articulated in the Action Transmittal Was Not Based 
on The Facts of This Case 
The Action Transmittal relied on by DHS to support its denial 
of benefits to Nelson's son is actually addressed to three separate 
issues that may arise when an AFDC recipient receives retroactive 
SSI. However, the issue raised by this appeal is not one of them. 
It addresses: (1) "whether or not States must recompute AFDC to 
adjust for any overpayments or underpayments created during the SSI 
retroactive period"; (2) "the treatment of SSI retroactive payments 
to or on behalf of individuals without continuing SSI eligibility"; 
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and (3) "whether child support payments collected during the SSI 
retroactive period must be redistributed to the AFDC family." R-
125. 
DHS ignored the fact that the transmittal was not addressed to 
the issue raised by Nelson's case, and then compounded its error by 
extracting isolated language from one portion of the document, 
which it construed as binding federal policy applicable to this 
case. That portion of the instruction states: 
AFDC Payments Made During the SSI Retroactive 
Period 
AFDC benefits for the SSI retroactive period 
will not be recomputed because they are 
correct payments. Section 402(a)(24)3 of the 
Act, which prohibits counting the income and 
resources of an SSI recipient for AFDC 
purposes, is applicable beginning on the date 
SSI payments are actually received. 
Therefore, since ineligibility does not begin 
prior to the receipt of the SSI payment, AFDC 
payments issued during the SSI application 
period and prior to actual receipt of SSI are 
correct payments. 
R-125. From this segment, DHS inferred that in all cases it would 
be reasonable to apply section 602(a)(24) in all situations 
"beginning on the date SSI payments are actually received." While 
this may be an easy way to solve the problem raised by Nelson's 
case, it is not fair and reasonable, nor is it clearly federal 
policy. There is no evidence that the federal agency ever 
addressed the facts presented by this case. At oral argument, DHS' 
counsel produced the Declaration of Diann Dawson, dated March 13, 
3Section 402(a)(24) is the official designation in the Social 
Security Act of the statute at issue. It corresponds to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 602(a)(24)* 
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1996, which purports to be policy applicable to this case. R-129. 
See Addendum. However, the declaration is no more than a summary 
of the language quoted above from Action Transmittal No. ACF-AT-
93-20. It does not address the unique facts presented by this 
appeal. It is aimed at an unrelated issue: the offsetting of SSI 
benefits by any AFDC benefits received. As will be argued below, 
the transmittal is not entitled to deference and produces an 
unreasonable result in this case. 
B. An Informal Statement of Policy By a Federal Agency Is Not 
Entitled to Deference 
Assuming for the sake of argument that the plain language of 
the statute does not resolve the issue raised by this appeal, then 
the court must ascertain the intent of Congress and give effect to 
that intent. Tello v. McMahon, 677 F. Supp. 1436, 1440 (E.D. Cal. 
1988). In making that determination the court must decide what 
deference, if any, should be given to an interpretation made by a 
federal agency responsible for implementing the statute. As will 
be seen, not every federal agency pronouncement is entitled to 
controlling weight. 
The courts which have considered the issue recognize that a 
policy which a federal agency has formally adopted is entitled to 
more weight than one reflecting merely the agency's informal 
interpretation. The former are sometimes referred to as 
"legislative rules" and the latter as "interpretative rules." Doe 
v. Reivitz, 830 F.2d 1441, 1446 (7th Cir. 1987). The decision in 
Chevron USA v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 104 
S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d. 694 (1984) is an example of a case wherein 
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formal, legislative rules were reviewed. The Court had before it 
EPA regulations formally promulgated in the Federal Register as 
required by the Administrative Procedures Act. These "legislative 
regulations," the Court found, were entitled to controlling weight, 
since the construction given the statute by the federal agency was 
a permissible one. 
The policy offered by DHS as controlling in this case is not 
a legislative rule, since it was never formally promulgated. It is 
more akin to the agency interpretation reviewed in Doe v. Reivitz, 
830 F.2d at 1446, wherein AFDC policy was expressed in a letter 
issued by an HHS regional administrator. Concerning the deference 
owed such interpretations, the court observed: 
The documents at issue in this case are 
interpretative rather than legislative in 
nature, and under longstanding principles, 
agency interpretations are not entitled to the 
same degree of deference commanded by the 
high-powered regulations reviewed in Chevron. 
See 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 
7:8 (1979). The Court in Chevron did not 
purport to alter the scope of review 
traditionally accorded interpretative 
documents. See American Federation of Labor 
v. Donovan, 757 F.2d 330, 340-41 & n. 7 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985). There are good reasons why the 
HHS statements in question here should be 
viewed as interpretative and accorded less 
deference than force-of-law regulations. 
The court went on to explain why an interpretative rule is not 
entitled to the same weight as a legislative rule: interpretative 
rules do not go through the notice-and-comment rule-making 
procedure followed when force-of-law rules are promulgated under 
the Administrative Procedures Act. 5 U.S.C. §553 (1982). 
Interpretative rules are not widely disseminated; frequently, a 
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state may not even know of the interpretative rule until a specific 
issue arises. Quoting K. Davis, the Doe v. Reivitz court concluded 
that agency interpretative rules, unlike legislative rules
 # are not 
binding on the courts: 
The courts may find [such documents] 
persuasive and may treat them as if they were 
binding, but the courts have the reserve of 
power to substitute their own judgment on all 
questions of statutory interpretation. The 
preliminary power of interpretation is in the 
agency, but the final power of interpretation 
is in the courts. 
2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §7:11, at 55 (1979) as 
quoted in. Doe v. Reivitz, 830 F.2d at 1447. Finally, the court 
noted that the weight to be given an agency interpretative rule 
depends on many factors, including: 
1. the validity of its reasoning; 
2. its consistency with earlier and later 
agency pronouncements; and 
3. whether the administrative document 
was issued contemporaneously with passage 
of the statute being interpreted. 
Doe v. Reivitz, 830 F.2d at 1447. 
The Action Transmittal relied on by DHS as federal policy can 
best be characterized as an interpretative rule. It is not a 
legislative, or force-of-law, rule, since it was never subjected to 
notice-and-comment rulemaking. Further, it appears that the policy 
has not been widely disseminated. The Action Transmittal never 
surfaced until the case was being briefed for summary judgment and 
was never even mentioned in the Gleim case. There is no evidence 
that the policy is being uniformly applied in other states. The 
policy was not developed and issued contemporaneously with the 
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statute in question, since the SSI program began in 1972 and the 
policy statement relied on by DHS was not issued until November 2, 
1993. R-124; 42 U.S.C. §1381. Therefore, given the interpretative 
nature of Action Transmittal No. ACF-AT-93-20, the policy statement 
relied on by DHS is not entitled to much weight and the court may 
make its own assessment of what the law means in this case. 
IV. IT IS REASONABLE TO INTERPRET THE STATUTE AS APPLYING TO 
NELSON DURING THE RETROACTIVE PERIOD 
The case law reveals that the federal interpretation of 
602(a) (24) came not from a formal review but from litigation 
focused on an unrelated AFDC issue. In Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania v. United States. 752 F.2d 795 (3rd Cir. 1984), the 
state of Pennsylvania brought litigation to challenge SSA's 
practice of deducting from initial retroactive SSI benefits the 
total amount of AFDC paid to the SSI recipient during the period of 
time the SSI application was pending. Since AFDC is a cooperative 
federal-state program, with each participating state paying a 
portion of the AFDC benefit, Pennsylvania argued it was entitled to 
a reimbursement of the portion of AFDC it had paid. Using section 
602(a)(24), Pennsylvania reasoned that since an SSI recipient is 
not eligible for AFDC, the portion of benefits it had paid during 
the SSI determination period was subject to recovery by the state. 
The district court agreed with SSA that 602(a) (24) did not apply to 
persons who received SSI benefits paid retroactively. The 
appellate court approved the lower court's decision but went on to 
observe: 
Notwithstanding the district court's analysis, 
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it is not altogether clear whether section 
602(a)(24) applies only to the time period 
during which an individual is actually 
receiving SSI benefit payments. For example, 
the language of the provision directs that a 
person may not be considered a part of an AFDC 
family 'for the period for which such [SSI] 
benefits are received.' Because an eligible 
SSI recipient begins to accrue benefits at the 
time he or she applies for benefits and 
because he or she is paid SSI benefits 
retroactively for the period between 
application and determination of eligibility, 
it would be reasonable to conclude that the 
SSI determination period is one for which SSI 
benefits are received. (Emphasis added). 
Another case which reached the same conclusion is Fitzgerald 
v. Schweiker, 538 F.Supp. 992 (D. Md. 1982). In that case, the 
court was asked to decide whether SSA's policy of applying a "per 
capita" rather than an "incremental" method of calculating AFDC 
benefits to be deducted from an SSI applicant's retroactive 
benefits was valid. The court concluded that section 602(a)(24) 
could be applied retroactively: 
[T]he intent of the statute is readily applied 
to the retroactive period. The statute covers 
'the period for which such [SSI] benefits are 
received' and therefore governs the payment of 
all SSI benefits, both prospective and 
retroactive. 
Fitzgerald v. Schweiker, 538 F. Supp. at 1002. 
It is clear from the case law that a reasonable interpretation 
of section 602(a) (24) is that it applies to SSI recipients who are 
found eligible but who, because of an SSA processing delay, receive 
part of their benefits in the form of a retroactive check. Nelson 
is one of those recipients. She was found eligible for SSI in July 
1992 and SSA properly deducted the AFDC she received during the SSI 
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determination period, thus preventing any double-dipping of AFDC 
and SSI benefits. The policy expressed in the Action Transmittal 
is reasonable, when applied under those circumstances. It becomes 
unreasonable when applied to a set of facts for which it was not 
intended. The court may, in that case, conclude properly that the 
more reasonable interpretation is that found in the Gleim and 
Fitzgerald decisions. 
To find that 602(a)(24) applies retroactively avoids an 
unreasonable result, something which the law pertaining to 
statutory interpretation urges. It is considered a "golden rule" 
of statutory interpretation that a possible interpretation of a 
statute that produces an unreasonable result should be rejected. 
U.S. v. Mevers, 808 F.2d 912, 919 (1st Cir. 1987); U.S. v. Bavko, 
774 F.2d 516, 522 (1st Cir. 1985). As one authority has stated: 
It has been called a golden rule of statutory 
interpretation that unreasonableness of the 
result produced by one among alternative 
possible interpretations of a statute is 
reason for rejecting that interpretation...." 
2A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 
45.12 at 54 (4th ed. 1984). 
United States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d at 919. 
The result urged by DHS in this case is especially 
unreasonable, since it denies benefits to a dependent child whom 
the Social Security Act was designed to benefit. The 
interpretation urged by DHS ignores what has been termed "a kind of 
common law of the AFDC statute" that the sins of the mother should 
not be visited on her children. Rush v. Smith, 573 F.2d 110, 118 
(2nd Cir. 1978). Another court, after reviewing a long line of 
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case law, starting with Kino v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 325 (1968), 
characterized the law as having erected "a fundamental principle of 
AFDC jurisprudence: that the Social Security Act will not 
countenance the depriving of needy children benefits because of 
factors beyond their control and unrelated to need." Simpson v. 
Miller. 535 F. Supp. 1041, 1050 (N.D. 111. 1982). 
In this case, it was not the sins of the mother that caused 
her dependent child to lose benefits but, rather, a processing 
delay by a federal agency. The processing of Nelson's SSI check 
was beyond the control of mother, child and state agency. Given 
that absence of control, it is unreasonable to interpret section 
602(a) (24) in a way that harms Nelson's son, when a more reasonable 
alternative exists which will better achieve the purpose of the 
Social Security Act. Such an approach is consistent with the well-
established principle that the Social Security Act must be 
construed liberally to achieve its remedial purpose. Doran v. 
Schweiker, 681 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1982); Keef v. Weinberger, 
404 F.Supp. 1193, 1195 (D.Kan. 1975)(The purpose of the Social 
Security Act "is to ameliorate some of the rigors of life for those 
who are disabled or impoverished..." and "must be construed 
liberally"). 
CONCLUSION 
Nelson asks the court to reverse the lower court decision and 
remand the case for entry of an order granting her summary 
judgment. She asks that a judgment be entered declaring that she 
was an SSI recipient under 42 U.S.C. §602(a)(24) at the time she 
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and SSI benefit programs by a policy that funds are not received 
until the recipient actually receives them. This policy is 
congruent with the operative language of the statute. 
The Court apologizes for the delay in rendering this decision. 
The undersigned's trial calendar has been onerous the past few 
months. Both counsel wrote excellent, persuasive memoranda. 
Ms. Jackson will prepare, please, an appropriate order. 
Dated this H day of May, 1996. 
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602(a)(24) and accords substantial deference to the interpretation espoused by the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services who is charged by Congress with implementing and enforcing this 
statute. The Secretary reconciles the overlap between the AFDC and SSI benefit programs by a 
poHcy that funds are not received until the recipient actually receives them. This policy is 
congruent with the operative language of the statute. 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is denied. 
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45CFR I iff ice of Family Assistance, ACF, I IMS 
*f the r 
vV&b fcngiuic lu i a i 
provided tha t the 
ble on the date th 
made; except that 
termined tha t the out be agency , 
previously denied assistance to wh, • 
the individual was entitled, Federal : 
nancial participation will be proviu-
in any corrective payment regardless 
of whether the individual is eligible on 
the date tha t the corrective payment is 
made. 
(4) Federal financial participation is 
available in assistance payments which 
are continued in accordance with the 
S ta te plan, for a temporary period dur-
ing which the effects of an eligibility 
condition are being overcome, e.g., 
blindness in AB, disability in APTD, 
physical or mental incapacity, contin-
ued absence of a parent, or unemploy-
ment of a principal earner in AFDC. 
(5) Where changed circumstances or a 
hearing decision makes the individual 
ineligible for any assistance, or eligible 
for a smaller amount of assistance 
than was actually paid, Federal finan-
cial participation is available in excess 
payments to such individuals, for not 
more than one month following the 
month in which the circumstances 
changed or the hearing decision was 
rendered. Federal financial participa-
tion is available where assistance is re-
quired to be continued unadjusted be 
cause a hearing has been requested. 
[36 FR 3866, Feb. 27, 1971, as amended at 38 
FR 8744, Apr. 6, 1973; 39 FR 26912, July 24, 
1974; 40 FR 32958, Aug. 5, 1975; 47 FR 5674, Feb. 
5, 1982; 47 FR 47828, Oct. 28, 1982; 51 FR 9204, 
Mar. 18, 1986; 57 FR 30158, July 8,1992] 
§233.20 Need and amount of .assist' 
ance. 
(a) Requirements for State Plans, A 
Sta te Plan for OAA, AFDC, AB, APTD 
or AABD must, as specified below: 
(1) General, (i) Provide tha t the deter-
mination of need and amount of assist-
ance for all applicants and recipients 
will be made on an objective and equi-
table basis and all types of income will 
be taken into consideration in the 
o i l . i .. •*••(.:' • ; f 
:nd 
' in Provide tha t the needs, income 
ind resources of individuals r e c e u m p 
SSI nenefits under t i t le XVI, individ 
lals with respect to whom Federal los-
er care payments are made md:%i Gl-
ials with respect to whom State or 
.ocal foster care payments are made, 
individuals with respect to whom Fed-
eral adoption assistance payments are 
made, or individuals with respect to 
whom Sta te or local adoption assist-
ance payments are made, for the period 
for which such benefits or payments 
are received, shall not be included in 
determining the need and the amount 
of the assistance payment of an AFDC 
assistance unit ; except t ha t the needs, 
income, and resources of an individual 
with respect to whom Federal adoption 
assistance payments are made, or indi-
viduals with respect to whom Sta te or 
local adoption assistance payments are 
made are included in determining the 
need and the amount of the assistance 
payment for an AFDC assistance unit 
of which the individual would other-
wise be regarded as a member where 
the amount of the assistance payment 
t ha t the uni t would receive would not 
be reduced by including the needs, in-
come, and resources of such individual. 
Under this requirement, "individuals 
receiving SSI benefits under t i t le XVI" 
include individuals receiving manda-
tory or optional S ta te supplementary 
payments under section 1616(a) of the 
Social Security Act or under section 
212 of Public Law 93-66, and "individ-
uals with respect to whom Federal fos-
ter care payments are made" means a 
child with respect to whom Federal fos-
ter care maintenance payments under 
section 472(b) and defined in section 
475(4)(A) of t i t l e IV-E of the Social Se-
curi ty Act are made, and a child whose 
costs in a foster family home or child 
care ins t i tu t ion are covered by the 
Federal foster care maintenance pay-
ments made with respect to his or her 
minor parent under sections 472(h) and 
475(4)(B) of t i t l e IV-E. "Individuals 
with respect to whom Federal adoption 
assistance payments are made" means 
a child who receives payments made 
under an approved t i t le IV-E plan 
based on an adoption assistance agree-
ment between the Sta te and the adop-
tive parents of a child with special 
needs, pursuant to sections 473 and 
475(3) of the Social Security Act. 
(iii) For AFDC, when an individual 
who is required to be included in the 
assistance unit pursuant to 
§206.10(a)(l)(vii) is also required to be 
included in another assistance unit , 
those assistance units must be consoli-
dated, and treated as one assistance 
unit for purposes of determining eligi-
bility and the amount of payment. 
(iv) For AFDC, when a S ta te learns 
of an individual who is required to be 
included in the assistance unit after 
the date he or she is required to be in-
cluded in the unit, the S ta te must re-
determine the assistance uni t ' s eligi-
bility and payment amount , including 
the need, income, and resources of the 
individual. This redetermination must 
be retroactive to the date t h a t the in-
dividual was required to be in the as-
sistance unit either through birth/ 
adoption or by becoming a member of 
the household. Any result ing overpay-
ment must be recovered or corrective 
payment made pursuant to 
§233.20(a)(13). 
(v) In determining need and the 
amount of payment for AFDC, all in-
come and resources of an individual re-
quired to be in the assistance unit, but 
subject to sanction under §250.34 or be-
cause of an intentional program viola-
tion under the optional fraud control 
program implementing section 416 of 
the Social Security Act, are considered 
available to the assistance unit to the 
same extent tha t they would be if the 
person were not subject to a sanction. 
However, the needs of the sanctioned 
individual(s) are not considered, In ac-
cord with §250.34(c), if a parent in an 
AFDC-UP case is sanctioned pursuant 
to § 233.100(a)(5), the needs of the second 
Parent are not taken into account in 
determining the family's need for as-
sistance and the amount of the assist-
ance payment unless the second parent 
is participating in the JOBS program. 
An individual required to be in an as-
sistance unit pursuant to 
§206.10(a)(l)(vii) but who fails to co-
operate in meeting a condition of his or 
{ter eligibility for assistance is a sanc-






PROGRAM STANDARDS - PROGRAM STANDARDS FOR UNCOMMON 
SITUATIONS 
212 Program Standards for Uncommon Situations 
212-1 Supplemental Security Income Recipients in AFDC Household 
1. SSI recipients in an AFDC household must be excluded from the 
household grant. Do not use the income and assets of SSI recipients 
to determine eligibility or to calculate the grant for the household. 
Use participation code "SS" on the SEPA screen for these clients. 
When the assets of an SSI recipient are combined with those of an 
AFDC family unit, such as in a checking or savings account, follow 
these rules to determine the portion of the resource available to the 
household: 
A. If the resource is jointly owned, divide the value equally among 
the owners. 
B. If the exempt funds can be identified, such as a lump sum SSI 
benefit, those funds remain exempt indefinitely. 
2. If the only dependent child is an SSI recipient, the caretaker 
relative(s) may receive an AFDC payment, provided he or she meets 
all other eligibility requirements. Base this payment on the need and 
countable income of the caretaker's relative only. On the SEPA 
screen, the participation code of the dependent child who receives 
SSI must be "SS". This will ensure that the child is not included in the 
payment. 
212-1 
02 '07/911 10 56 F l l 801 r T,H 4 2 1 : OFS STATE ADMIN, @005 
Aid To Families UA. D*e*rtm#m ct H**ftfi*n4 Human Itfriegg 
with Dependent Children (AFDC) ZXXttSXZ'™* 
Action Transmittal Wtftilngtoa O.C, 20447 
Transmittal No. MT-A.T-9 3-20 Date November 2, 19S3 
SUBJECT: 
STATE ADMINISTRATORS AND OTHER INTERESTED 
ORGANIZATIONS AND AGENCIES 
Treatment of Retroactive SSI and Child Support 





Section 402(a) (24) of the Social Security Act 
45 CFR 233.20(a)(1)(ii) and (3)(X) 
45 CFR 233.20(a)(13)(ii) 
Zsblev v. Sullivan, 1 10 S. Ct. 885 {3 990) 
1Q clarify Federal AFDC policy with respect to 
treatment of retroactive SSI payments and child 
support payments collected during the SSI 
retroactive period« 
Section 402(a) (24) of 'the social security Act ( the 
Act) provides "that if an individual is receiving 
benefits under title XVI ... then, for the period 
for which such benefits are received .. - such 
individual shall not be regarded as a member of a 
family for purposes of determining the amount of 
benefits of the family under this title [IV-A] and 
his income and resources shall not be counted as 
income and resources..." for AFDC purposes. 
The Social Security Administration (SSA) considers 
an individual eligible for SSI benefits beginning 
with the date of application and pays 
retroactively to that date. The retroactive 
period is the SSI application processing or 
determination period, which varies depending on 
the time it takes to develop a claim. In 
calculating the retroactive SSI payment, income 
which the individual received during the 
retroactive period reduces the amount of the 
retroactive SSI payment- AFDC payments received 
during the retroactive period are treated as 
income. 
1 f) 4 
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Page 2 - SSI Retroactive Payments 
We have received inquiries from States on three 
issues related to the SSI retroactive period. The 
first issue pertains to whether or not States must 
recompute AFDC to adjust for any overpayments or 
underpayments created during the SSI retroactive 
period. The second issue involves the treatment 
of SSI retroactive payments to or on behalf of 
individuals without continuing SSI eligibility. 
The third issue relates to whether child support 
payments collected during the SSI retroactive 
period must be redistributed to the AFDC family. 
Because of the number of inquiries received, we 
are issuing this Transmittal to clarify Federal 
policy with respect to these concerns. 
INSTRUCTION: AFDC Payments Hade During the SSI Retroactive 
Per.jflfl 
AFDC benefits for the SSI retroactive period will 
not be recomputed because they are correct 
payments. Section 402(a)(24) of the Act, which 
prohibits counting the income and resources of an 
SSI recipient for AFDC purposes/ is applicable 
beginning on the date SSI payments are actually 
received. Therefore, since ineligibility does not 
begin prior to the receipt of the SSI payment, 
AFDC payments issued during the SSI application 
processing period and prior to actual receipt of 
SSI are correct payments. 
Treatment of Retroactive SSI Payments to 
Individuals Without Continuing SST Eligibility 
In some cases, an individual no longer eligible 
for SSI may receive a lump sum retroactive SSI 
payment, e.g,, the SSI retroactive lump sum 
payments resulting from the Zeblev v. Sullivan 
Supreme Court decision- In that case, the United 
States Supreme Court declared invalid the 
Secretary's criteria for denying SSI claims for 
disabled children* under the new standard, an 
individual no longer eligible for SSI, but 
eligible for a prior period on the basis of the 
new standard, may receive a retroactive payment. 
In addition, a SSI retroactive payment could be 
made to an assistance unit for a deceased child, 
or to stepparents and other individuals who are 
not included in the AFDC assistance unit, but 
whose income is deemed to it-
02 '07/96 10 57 FAX 80 j "\H I^  L:: OFS STATE ADMIN. 0007 
Page 3 - SSI Retroactive. Payments. 
Recognizing that SSI, like AFDC, i s a basic needs 
program, and that the payments at issue are for a 
period when the individual was both eligible and 
needy, and that the AFDC family may have incurred 
debts for care of the disabled individual during 
the SSI retroactive period, we have decided to 
treat SSI retroactive payments in the same manner 
as AFDC retroactive corrective payments, pursuant 
to 45 CFR 233.20(a) (13) (ii) - This approach 
provides a reasonable period for the family to use 
the money before it must be counted. 
Accordingly, a non-recurring lump sum SSI 
retroactive payment, made to an AFDC recipient, 
shall not be counted as income or a resource for 
AFDC purposes in the month paid and the next 
following month-
In those cases where a stepparent or other 
individual who is not included in the AFDC 
assistance unit, but whose income is deemed t~ It, 
receives a non-recurring lump sum SSI payment - * 
shall be deemed to the assistance unit, after 
applying disregards where appropriate. This 
approach recognizes that these individuals ar 
longer needy in the eyes of the law and, 
therefore, the current AFDC policy deeming th 
income to meet the needs of the AFDC family i: 
applicable. It should be noted that the lump suz. 
rule in §402 (a) (17) is not applied to income 
received by deemers, and that a retroactive SSI 
payment to a deemer would become a resource after 
the month it is received. The retroactive SSI 
payment to the deemer would therefore only be 
counted in determining the eligibility and amount 
of payment to the AFDC uni t I n the month it J s 
received. 
Child Support Collected Purina the SSI Retroactive 
Period 
Child support payments collected during 'the SSI 
retroactive period will not be redistributed 
because the AFDC benefits paid to a family, while 
one of the family member's application for SSI is 
pending, are correct payments. Until there is a 
determination of SSI eligibility, the family is 
eligible to receive AFDC benefits and is required 
02/07/96 10:57 FAX 801 mn 4212 OFS STATE ADMIN. 12008 
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to assign all rights to support to the state in 
accordance with section 402(a)(26)• Therefore, 
child support payments received by the title IV-D 
agency and retained pursuant to section 457(b)(2) 
and (b) (4) of the Act and the regulations at 45 
CFR 302.51(b)(2) and (b)(4) as reimbursement for 
any past AFDC payments are correct distributions. 
AFDC trust Policy 
States may wish to inform individuals that receive 
a SSI retroactive payment of the AFDC trust 
policy* The trust policy provides that in the 
absence of a contrary state policy regarding 
transfer of assets, funds in excess of the $1,000 
resource limit can be preserved while a family 
receives AFDC, if they are placed in an 
irrevocable trust. The AFDC trust policy is 
enunciated in AT-93-2 dated January 19, 1993* 
EFFECTIVE 
DATE: January lr 1994. 
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IN TIIIIK I > [STRICT COURT OF jmE-iSECOND^JIJDIOAi i-LSTKlC'J 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LI i i l 
JOIE D. NELSON, 
Plaintiff, 
ROD BETIT, in his capaci 
as Executive Director 
of the Utah Department 
of Human Services, 
Defendant, 
Civil No. 33^ 
ar.-** ic^ of Diarr fi 
1 1 am presently employed in tne capcu-iuy or Deputy Director 
of the Office of Family Assistance (OFA) in the Administration 
for Children and Fami 1 ies 
2 • OFA has overall responsibility for the administration of the 
Federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program 
under title IV-A of the Social Security Act and provides policy 
guidance to States and others regarding implementation of the 
AFDC program. 
3. OFA's operative policy is that section 4 02(a) (24) of tf. J: 
Social Security Act (the Act) is applicable beginning on the date 
that Supplemental Security Income (SSI) payments under title XVI 
of the Act are actually received, and not on the date SSI 
eligibility begins. 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1 7 46, I declare under penalty of perjury 
that the foregoing is true and correct. 
I / I M d f i 1 i > H l J 9 6 . E x e m i t i MI i i in )$' 
^ Diann Dawson 
Deputy Director 
Office of Family Assist ;vm, • 
Administration for 
Children and Families 
Department of Health and Human Services 
TOTAL 
